Sunday, 25 January 2015

Research Design.. A Case Study


Hypothesis: “The more information people have about their (national or local) government’s activities, the more likely they are to trust the government.”

The operational hypothesis is the higher the percentage of citizens who watch television on government’s development activities, the higher the percentage of citizens’ trust in the government. The independent variable is the level of information about the government’s actions, while the dependent variable is trust in government. The independent variable is thought to cause the dependent variable, and it is this causality that this research attempts to measure. The unit of analysis is individuals (watching or not watching television programmes on government’s activities). An opinion research will be conducted to ascertain whether an individual watches national television programmes on government’s activities, and whether or not s/he trusts the government. The true experimental and quasi-experimental designs would be used to undertake this research in Liberia.

True Experimental Design
A Social Science 102 class comprising 100 students will constitute the experimental study group. A total of 100 tickets will be printed with number one written on 50 of them, and number two on the rest.  All the tickets will then be mixed in a sealed box. During Wednesday’s class, each student will be asked to pick only one ticket from the box containing the 100 tickets. This process constitutes the randomized selection in the true experimental design. The randomization assumes that the two experimental groups selected for the research would be statistically identical in their distribution on both the dependent variable and all other variables whether or not they are being measured.
Following the random selection of tickets, all 50 students with number one tickets would be assembled in a class room to be used as the treatment group to which the stimulus (television news on government’s activities) will be administered. The remaining 50 students with the number two tickets will be the control group. They will sit in a separate class room while the treatment group watches two hours television programme on government’s development activities (the stimulus). At the end of the television programme, all the 100 students will be requested to complete a questionnaire about trust and confidence in the Liberian government. This questionnaire would measure the posttest results. The level of trust in government as measured from students who watched the television programme will be compared with that of the students who did not.  If higher number of students who watched the television programme expresses trust in the government, it would then be concluded that the independent variable (more information about government’s activities) causes the dependent variable (trust in government).

Quasi-Experimental Design
Using the same 100 students, the dependent variable would be tested before and after the independent variable has been applied (Monroe 2000, p.38).  Students will not be assigned in groups.  All 100 students would be asked to complete a questionnaire about trust in the Liberian government. This questionnaire is intended (as a pretest) to measure the level of trust all of them have in the Liberian government. After this pretest, the students would be requested to watch two hours television programme on the government’s development activities. This will serve as a stimulus after which a posttest measuring the extent to which a change in the level of trust in government has occurred. All the students will be asked again to complete a questionnaire measuring their trust in government (posttest). The posttest would be carried out irrespective of whether or not all the students watched the television programme. If the level of trust expressed in the government in the posttest exceeds that of the pretest, this change (increased trust in government) would be attributed to the stimulus thereby leading to the conclusion that high level of information about government’s activities leads to trust in the government.

Validity       
The same unit of analysis (individuals) will be used to measure the hypothesis. These two designs have high face validity because the measure looks right to the researcher. The internal validity of the true experimental design is higher compared to the quasi-experimental because the manipulation and randomization of the experimental groups ensured that no other variable interfered. We can therefore claim causality in the true experimental research compared to the quasi-experimental one under which the experimental group was not manipulated or controlled. The content validity and construct validity are low in both designs. For example, this research cannot be content valid when it does not actually consider all the causal elements that increase trust in the government. It is possible that citizens may be adequately informed about their government, but yet have less trust in it, or this could be the reverse. The external validity of these two designs is low because generalizable claims cannot be made across the general population, in all settings and at all times. Regarding construct validity, it cannot be claimed with absolute certainty that inferences from this research can become a functioning reality (Bollen 1989). Finally, the credibility of the television programme is another factor to consider. An independent television would have an objective analysis of government’s activities compared to a state owned television. Hence the ownership or control of the television programme could affect validity.

Causality
We can claim causality because these two designs have accounted for correlation, time order and nonspuriousness (Monroe 2000, p.32). The posttest comparisons in both designs indicate that there is a correlation between the independent and dependent variables due to the change observed in the level of trust as an effect of the stimulus. Nonspuriousness is ensured in the true experimental design because the treatment and controlled groups were considered to be exactly the same in all aspects due to the use of the randomized selection process, but nonspuriousness in the quasi-experimental design is questionable because the pretest of the students must have aroused their interest in the study thus affecting their responses in the posttest. Also, outside influences (previous exposure, maturation and conversations during the interval between the pretest and posttest) must have affected their responses. It is therefore difficult to attribute change to the stimulus in the quasi-experiment as the students were not controlled, randomized and equal in all aspects. Regarding time order, this criterion has been addressed because the stimulus was applied prior to the posttest measurement of the dependent variable in both experimental designs.

Strengths & Weaknesses
The artificial setting and manipulation of students in the true experiment is problematic because humans cannot be controlled like laboratory animals. Therefore, the results from the true experiment may not be obtained in real life situation. However, we can use this design to study general features of a small group of people. These designs lack genuine representative sample to back claims for generalizability and external validity. It would be difficult to conduct such research nationwide or amongst a group of countries. In the quasi-experimental design, it is uncertain that all other causal variables have been eliminated (Shively 2013, p.85). These designs are cost and time efficient, but replicating them nationwide would be cost intensive.

References
Bollen, A 1989, Structural equations with latent variables, Wiley & Sons, USA.

Shively, W 2013, The craft of political research, Pearson Prentice Hall, USA.

Monroe, A 2000, Essentials of political research, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, USA.

By Tom Kaydor
thkaydor@gmail.com



Sunday, 18 January 2015

Initial thoughts as Deputy Minister (designate) for ICEI-MFA


Our initial views on what the Department of International Cooperation and Economic Integration needs to achieve after our confirmation by the Liberian Senate.

By Tom Kaydor (thkaydor@gmail.com) 

Introduction
The Department of International Cooperation and Economic Integration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs coordinates negotiation of all bilateral and multilateral agreements to which Liberia is a party. The Department also leads formulation of such agreements, and subsequently monitors and evaluates their implementation between Liberia and its bilateral and multilateral partners on the one hand, and by government agencies and ministries on the other. It represents the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at various meetings, conferences and economic fora on International Cooperation and Economic Integration, advises the Foreign Minister in this premise, and prepares cooperation and integration policy briefs, options and analysis for the Presidency through the Office of the Minister.

The Department is led by the Deputy Minister for International Cooperation and Economic Integration, and comprises two technical Bureaus: the Bureau of International Cooperation and Economic Affairs and the Bureau of International Organizations Affairs. Each Bureau is headed by an Assistant Minister. The Department has 30 staff members including Desk Officers, Research Analysts and Assistants, and other clerical staff.

Cognizant of its statutory mandate, the Department has developed the key deliverables hereunder for six months (January to June 2015). Although most of them would continue beyond this timeframe, these deliverables will serve as a compass for the Department in the first half of 2015. They encompass the programme outcomes and activities consistent with the Ministry’s Performance Contact signed with the President of Liberia, and the Government Agenda for Transformation.

The key components of the Department’s deliverables are:

·         Effective Coordination and Oversight;
·         Documentation and Policy Research;
·         Capacity Development;
·         Trade and Investment Promotion;
·         Ebola Response and Post-Ebola Recovery Planning and Implementation

Goal
To enhance the Foreign Ministry’s performance, and promote Liberia’s national interest through economic diplomacy.


Objectives:
·         To coordinate negotiation, formulation and signing of all government’s bilateral and multilateral cooperation agreements, and ensure their effective implementation, monitoring and evaluation;

·         To promote trade and investment through strategic partnership with Liberia’s Foreign Missions, Embassies near Monrovia, International Organizations, and the National Investment Commission;

·         To fully document and re-document all government’s bilateral and multilateral agreements, track, monitor and evaluate their full implementation;

·         To conduct evidence based research, and prepare strategic policy briefs, policy options and policy analysis in lieu of promoting Liberia’s economic diplomacy through effective bilateral and multilateral cooperation and economic integration;

·         To develop requisite capacity for the effective and efficient functioning of the department in particular, and the Ministry and other government agencies and ministries in general;

·         Increase Liberia’s visibility and participation in, and enhance government’s strategic engagement with International Organizations;

·         Promote government’s ebola response strategy, and fast track post-ebola development planning and implementation through robust and proactive bilateral and multilateral partnership.

Expected outcome:
Liberia’s national interest (the security of the state and the wellbeing of its people) promoted through strategic bilateral and multilateral cooperation and economic integration.

A detailed matrix of deliverables with budget has been presented to the Management Team of the Ministry.

Liberia First!

Monday, 13 October 2014

Redundancy of Liberia government's 'non-essential staff': Reflections

Civil Service Agency’s proposed redundancy reform process: an initial reaction
Part I:


By Tom Kaydor  /  thkaydor@gmail.com

In some of my posts on the Civil Service Agency’s proposed reform to downsize non-essential staff in ministries and agencies, I did promise to do further analysis on said issue and this is the beginning of the process. It is good to have a well written policy, but it is preferable to have a policy that would be implemented and that will positively impact the governance process. Such reforms must equally tend to reduce poverty and increase equitable distribution of the nation’s resources. That said, besides the seeming lack of an implementation strategy and the proposed reform’s likely inability to affect the legislature and the Judiciary (as others have argued), the timing for such policy reform in Liberia would have disastrous consequences and might increase poverty in the already poor country (4th poorest in the world).

First, poverty in itself reduces people’s consumer surplus and affects aggregate demand. This affects national economy and reduces the country’s international competitiveness and as well retards economic growth, thus further limiting the government’s ability to spare resources for transfers; hence fueling poverty in return. The main asset the poor have is their labor, which in Liberia cannot easily find a market. Private school teachers for example are practically out of job as most of them are not being paid at present. There is no point mentioning the already jobless thousands in the country. The responsibility of the civil servants who are receiving pay has therefore increased given our setting which makes a singular bread winner in a family the sole provider for all. So poverty arguably continues to increase in Liberia, and this will continue to reduce aggregate demand.

Second, in the ebola environment, there are several factors that project an increment in poverty. During the ebola (the greatest global health epidemic posing major national security threat to affected nations), some investments have closed down. Their return and full operation might not be fully realized under this current government. Those who had jobs at those concessions are now temporarily unemployed. Local businesses have been undermined, if some would not or have not already crumbled.  The mainstay of our country’s economy (subsistence agriculture) is grossly affected. Take Lofa for instance where farmers have lost entire season of their production. In fact all farmers in Liberia have been affected. This has far reaching social and economic consequences and might even affect the politics. As families are affected, school would be opening at the end of the virus, these poor families need social protection interventions to not only feed themselves, but to also address children’s school fees, uniforms, tuition and other relate expenditures. This simply shows how poverty would even further increase in Liberia. The Minister of Finance has affirmed the grave economic, social and political challenges that the ebola brings along. He aired this during his interview on the LBS talk show. Presently, some people are unable to pay their rent. Take the case of an ebola survival who on his return from the ETU was put out due to expiration of his rent, and his inability to pay the land lord who singularly survives on the rent friom his humble home in Banjul Community. This story was shared on the Truth FM radio. WFP is presently distributing food and relief items. This should inform that the situation in Liberia is grave and will go a long way. Indeed poverty has increased where majority of the people cannot meet the minimum nutritional suppliments needed on a daily basis. Simply put, the impact of the ebola virus on Liberia would be very significant to the point government now has to begin thinking about increasing transfers to those who are working and those who are jobless. Social protection benefits must be provided to the poor, and social safety nets must be provided to the vulnerable who might fall back into the poverty gap (this includes ‘the non-essential staff’).

Instead of concentrating on such poverty reduction moves, the policy reform to redundant non-essential staff of government aims to remove civil servants from the labor market, and according to the policy (as others have argued) they will be given capacity to lead them to other sectors of employment. Where are the other employment sectors? Where are those sectors when in 2005 campaign it was promised that we would run a small and efficient government, but have only seen the creation of commissions and new government entities with huge salaries and allowances? Where are those other job sectors when we can only witness an increment in the salaries, allowances and other benefits of elected officials and political appointees? Statistically, the salaries of the non-essential staff may not be the significant part of our expenditure. You may need to get the data and run your regressions. Our expenditure is about the huge and discretionary allowances given to some staff in agencies and ministries under the whims and caprices of ministers. Our expenditures are on the luxurious cars and sometimes needless travels of government officials. Our key expenditures are not on those filling clerks or cleaners or secretaries (now considered non-essential). The huge expenditures are paid to some of the very Liberians who are 'consultants' at various ministries and agencies. How much do the non-essential staff earn? Granted that those considered non-essential will be paid for two years and then be transitioned to separation benefits, what is the volume of the pay to non-essential staff compared to political appointees, national consultants and elected officials? Think about it.

Third, on the question of training those to be put down, could the CSA provide an analysis of prospective labor markets/job markets to which they will be shifted. Over 12 years of post-conflict governance, one needs not to lecture about our failure to link the unemployed youths and adults with jobs. We have not created the needed jobs. Is it in an immediate post-ebola environment that such jobs would be generated? Give us the prognosis. Government indicated it would have provided 20 thousand jobs, redeemed 20 million dollars from ghost names, et al. Have those jobs come and gone? Where are the ghosts when there are genuine staff members working in agencies and ministries, but not yet on pay roll for the past five to ten years and even above?

Fourth, Liberia is poised with political tension mainly due to poverty. People are advocating for a change of government amidst an ebola crisis. They argue that the government is corrupt, has failed and needs to giveway. At the same time, some members of the ruling Unity Party are demanding jobs in the very civil service. Health workers are presently agitating for strike actions in demand of their pay and employment. Several teachers are still yet to get on the official pay roll of government. Is it politically feasible to carry out such reform that will affect people who have only relied on government‘s jobs over the years? Are we not venturing with political rivalry and strong opposition from the civil servants? I think the timing for such reform is politically wrong and might lead to demonstrations, strikes, et al. For any policy reform to succeed, it must have the political will, the time must be ripe, and the policy entrepreneurs must find the appropriate venue to introduce same. Introducing such shake up in the civil service during a health epidemic might do more harm than good. This reform does not have the coupling of the problem, politics and policy.

Last, from my experience, and you may share yours, there is no effective and objective criteria and mechanism to measure the efficiency and effectiveness of staff in ministries and agencies. There has also been no objective criteria on which staff are paid. In fact there has been no set and objective criteria for staff recruitment in the civil service over the years. There are instances in which degree holders are office assistants or filing clerks when non degree holders are their supervisors. The first thing to do therefore would be to develop a mechanism through which staff would be placed in positions based on their qualifications and experience. This is called merit system. That is not the focus of this policy. The policy seeks to cleverly fire civil servants. We need to put in place measurable deliverables based on employee’s job description that must conform to contemporary realities. Have you seen the generic CSA TORs? Have you seen the evaluation forms for civil servants? I have seen them, and think better not to have those generic TORs and evaluation forms that currently exist. Is there any empirical study showing information about essential and non-essential staff in terms of the reality on the ground in ministries and agencies? What is that study indicating, if any? From my experience in the government, to the best of my knowledge, such research has not been done yet.


To conclude, as earlier stated, the policy reform looks good on the face, but the timing appears to be wrong. There must be a detailed study on the cost and benefits of this reform especially during the time of ebola crisis. Any hasty implementation of such policy reform might lead to outcomes otherwise intended thereby leading to huge negative unintended consequences. After all, this proposed restructuring of the civil service must also involve the other two branches of government: the Judiciary and the Legislature. And it is only my hope that they would endorse and comply with the terms  of such reform. Remember, poor people are hungry people. Hungry people are angry people. Angry people many times become violent. Too much poverty may therefore create instability in Liberia. 'A hint to a wise is quite sifficient'.

Saturday, 20 September 2014

Analysis and policy recommendations on Thailand's binding constraint

Addressing Thailand's middle-income problem

By Tom Kaydor/ thkaydor@gmail.com

I. Introduction to the case

On 1 July 2011, Thailand became a middle-income economy (World Bank 2014).  This economic progress translated into poverty reduction, improved wellbeing, and increased access to public goods and services. For example, ‘over 40 per cent of the Thai population escaped poverty in the past 25 years’ (Jitsuchon 2012, p.13). However, Thailand’s national income statistics (1952-2011) show declining annual growth rates from about ten per cent in early 1990s and afterward due to the Asian and global financial crises, the 2011 floods and political instability (World Bank 2014). Since 1997, Thailand’s growth rate has stagnated around four per cent (Jitsuchon 2012), and its current GDP per capita is US$4420 (UNDP 2014). Due to this stagnant growth, Thailand is said to be caught in a ‘middle income trap’ (Benyaapikul & Phongpaichit 2013, p.1). A middle-income trap results ‘when a country graduates from a low-income economy to a middle-income economy, but stagnates without much prospect of advancing to a developed country status’ (Gill et al. 2007 cited in Jitsuchon 2012, p.15, Kharas and Kholi, p.281). 

Although there are more complex issues to address to promote growth in Thailand, this essay argues that political instability remains the country’s binding constraint. This constraint results from recurrent military interventions in Thai politics, centralized state power, and the failure of key political actors to reach mutually beneficial political compromises (Chambers 2010). The essay therefore proposes that the government of Thailand decentralize power to elected regional governments that will manage local development programmes while the central government concentrates mainly on macro level issues like monetary policy and national security.

II. Key problem or issue in the case

In 1932, Thailand became a constitutional monarchy, replacing the absolute monarchy that was considered a barrier to Thai development (Dixon 1999). Since then, the country adopted 17 different constitutions, and witnessed over 18 actual and attempted military coups (Tweechie 2011). Thailand is politically unstable because of the recurrent meddling of the military into politics (Chambers 2010). As Laothamatas (1988) contends, bureaucrats and military officers centrally manage the affairs of the state. The country, according to Chambers (2010), is a ‘tutelary democracy, ‘a form of defective and unstable democracy under which non-elected elites (the monarch, privy council and military) hold veto powers over elected officials’ (p.837).

In early 2014, failure of the two major rival parties in Thailand to reach political compromise led to another military intervention. Thousands of protesters led by Suthep Thaugsuban, former deputy prime minister and powerbroker in the Democratic Party (‘Yellow Shirts’) mainly Southerners locked down Bangkok, forcing Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra of the Pheu Thai Party (‘Red Shirts’ predominantly from the North and Northeast) to step down, despite a confidence vote from parliament (Nehru 2014). Due to the political stalemate and eventual break down of law and order resulting from the demonstration amongst rival parties, the Thai military declared martial law on 20 May 2014, ordered the cabinet to report to it, and banned gatherings of more than five people (BBC News 22/05/2014). Thailand is presently under a military dictatorship.

III. Theoretically informed discussion of the problem

Political instability is Thailand’s major challenge. First, it undermines economic growth and development, and weakens the share of investment in GDP (Alesina and Perotti 1996). Empirical studies have tested and agreed with said relationship. For example, studies by Barro et al. (1997) and Barro (1996) show a direct negative impact of political instability on economic growth. Also, political instability is a fundamental variable to explain the systematic underperformance of African countries between 1970 and1990 (Guillaumont et al. 1999, Azam et al. 1996 cited in Kefi & Zouhaier 2011, p.798). For their part, De Haan and Siermann (1996) do not contest the effect of instability on growth, but state that instability negatively impacts investment, and low investment slows growth.

Second, instability stalls the building of effective institutions, one of the deep determinants of growth (Rodrik 2003). Institutions are important for sustainable economic growth, but without stability, such growth remains utopian. Peter Hall (1986) defines institutions as ‘the formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and economy’ (p.938). Institutions provide incentives for investment and structure an economy (North 1991). For instance, the Republic of Botswana grew at 7.7 per cent annually from 1965 to 1998 due to the viable political institutions that guaranteed property rights, law and order, prudent resource management, merit based public bureaucracy, and investment in education, health and infrastructure (Acemoglu et al. 2001 cited in Rodrik 2003).

Third, political instability impedes growth, freedom, and prosperity. Thailand is generally violent, socially divided and overwhelmed by populist movements with a large number of actors capable of blocking reforms (Chambers 2010). These divisive factors prevent the building of democratic institutions like those in Botswana, Japan, South Korean, Singapore, et al (Rodrik 2010). The unstable environment undermines economic growth because Thailand operates as a centralized bureaucratic polity mostly ruled by the military class. In addition to this, ‘parties use ministerial positions to enhance factional power in a continuing process of logrolls’ (Pasuk & Baker, 2000, p. 138), and corruption is widespread in the public sector (Pasuk & Baker, 1998, p. 260). Such governance deficiencies are a result of weak institutions nurtured by instability. As Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) argue, authoritarian, centralized and exclusive institutions, like those in Thailand, have disastrous consequences on growth as they avail no incentives for investment and innovation. Accordingly ‘it is politics, not geography, culture, et al., that determines the economy’ (p. 544). Effective institutions create a level playing field whereby most citizens can enjoy secure property rights, gain access to an independent judicial system, develop their personal capabilities (North 1991), and invest in technology and innovation for steady economic progress (Jones & Romer 2010). Institutions become even more effective when they are inclusive and decentralized.

Last, instability is further compounded by constitutional biases against elected officials. This increases political volatility. For instance, the constitution allows the military and judiciary to appoint and approve independent bodies, such as the National Counter Corruption Commission, the Election Commission, and the Constitutional Court Judges (Thai Constitution 2007). The military can institute marshal law, and effect promotions in its ranks and file (Chambers 2010). The constitution also forbids the Parliament from approving Thai military budget, which sharply rose from ‘US$2b in 2006 to about US$6b in 2011’ (Chambers 2010, p.850). It grants ‘vetos to the non-elected monarch, privy council and the military’ over elected parliamentarians (Chambers 2010, p. 827). Finally, the Thai judiciary sometimes interferes with the parliament by removing prime ministers as was done in 2007, 2008 (Howes & Lopez, 2013, p.8), and 2014 (BBC News 22/05/2014). Such practices increase political instability and slow economic growth in Thailand (Kuhonta 2011).

IV. Decentralisation as a pathway to stability and economic growth

Economic reforms are one of the options for growth in Thailand. According to Jitsuchon (2012), Thailand’s growth relied on ‘cheap labour, and low innovation, with technological acquired mainly through technology importation’ (p.15). As one of the stylized facts of growth predicts, once a state grows towards the technology frontier, its growth slows (Jones & Romer 2010). Thus, Thailand’s old growth model can no longer expand growth. However, if one should rely on economic growth theory, then the country must readjust its economic model. It must diversify production networks (Kharas & Kholi 2011), break monopolistic powers, decentralize governance, and invest in education, research and development to trigger innovations (Jimanez et al. 2012, Acemoglu & Zillibotti 1999). However, all these growth corridors cannot survive amidst political instability in Thailand (Alesina & Perotti 1996).

Consequently, Thai reform agenda must focus on decentralization to create political stability as a precursor to all other reforms. Decentralisation is the transfer of powers from central government to lower levels in an administrative hierarchy (Crook & Manor 1998). It locally provides efficient public goods compared to central government (Oates 1972). Decentralization creates an enabling environment for inclusive political, economic and social reforms because the locals directly lead decision making; it therefore usually promotes political stability. Decentralization gives local authorities the freedom to compete, innovate, and attract investment and technology, which generate local employment, productivity and growth. Employment opportunities drive skills development through education to enhance human capital (TDRI 2012). Enhanced human capital increases productivity and promotes innovation; and all of these factors combined increase growth (Jones & Romer 2010).

To begin the process of decentralization, the current Thai government should constitutionally set up regional governments. The regional governments will comprise locally elected parliaments, premiers and appointed judiciaries. They will manage and support regional and local development programmes, and invest in economic activities like agriculture and industry. The central government would focus on macro level issues like monetary policy and national security. Decentralization might shift attention from Bangkok to regional governments, promote equitable distribution of economic opportunities, increase competition and accountability, enhance trade and investment, and spur innovation. It will stabilize Thailand because the ‘Yellow Shirts’, mainly Southerners, would focus on their regional government, while the ‘Red Shirts’ would concentrate on theirs in the North. The military and political elites in Bangkok would be compelled to address regional demands to gain regional authorities’ support.

While decentralization might increase political stability, increase access to basic services, promote regional competition, and spur growth, it might cause new problems such as a clash in resource allocation between the central and local authorities, and the decline of state macroeconomic management. According to Zhong Zhu Ding (1998), decentralization complicates and disturbs China's growth and development. In September 1995, Chinese President Jiang Zemin said ‘in the process of structural reform, some provinces favoured their local interests and therefore resisted the central government's policies’ (Zhong p.63).  Decentralization in Thailand might therefore weaken central macroeconomic management, and undermine national unity. However, Thailand needs to constitutionally spell out the powers of central and provincial governments to mitigate against the possible drawbacks of devolution.


 References
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Acemoglu, D, Robinson, J 2012, Why nations fail: the origins of power, prosperity and poverty, New York, USA.

Acemoglu, D, Zillibotti, F 1999, ‘Productivity differences’, NBER Working Papers No. 6879, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.

Baker, C, Pasuk, P 1998, Thailand’s boom and bust, Silkworm Books, Chiang Mai, Thailand.

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Crook, R, Manor, J 1998, Democracy and decentralization in South Asia and West Africa, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

De Haan, J, Siermann, J 1998, ‘Further evidence on the relationship between economic freedom and economic growth’, Public Choice, no. 95, pp.363-380, MIT Press, Cambridge.

Dixon, J, Heffernan, M 1991, Colonialism and development in the contemporary world, London, England, New York,: Mansell Pub.

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Zhong, D 1998, ‘Decentralization and new central-local conflicts in China’, American Asian Reviewhttp://search.proquest.com.virtual.anu.edu.au/assets/r20141.2.2-2/core/spacer.gif, vol. 16 no. 4http://search.proquest.com.virtual.anu.edu.au/assets/r20141.2.2-2/core/spacer.gif, pp.63-94.


Friday, 12 September 2014

All Hail to Liberian Health Workers


Thankink the Health Workers in Liberia for fighting ebola:
By Tom Kaydor/thkaydor@gmail.com

Dr. Brown and all those health workers who have paid the ultimate price with their lives as well as those who remain on the frontline must be commended. There are lessons to learn. Most of the health students in Liberia support their personal education. Now they are putting their lives on the line for our country like the military and police would do in time of national security crisis. Just as we pay from national budget to train the army and police, it is about time we consider free education for all health workers in Liberia after the ebola crisis. This will not only help health students whose academic sojourn is constrained by financial problems, it will also encourage more Liberian high school graduates to enter the health sector. From the ebola crisis, we must now know that health and education are very much important for nation building. If a population is sick, it cannot make progress. Imagine businesses and investments are closed, etc. People are stopping flights while others are abandoning their positions in government due to ebola. This should remind us that health is very much important. But how do we get professional health workers? We must provide for their education. This brings education as the most important priority for any given country. Henceforth, Liberian must take education and health as the two major obstacles to overcome if we must prosper, grow our economy and develop. This is the time to provide the millions of US Dollars to train Liberians in health and education. Free education for all from KG to 12 grade, free education for all health and natural science students. These are the programmes the government must focus on and lobby the international community to support after the ebola crisis, and I am quite certain that we now have more justifications to make such claims. These are programmes donors would like to support after the ebola, only and only if the people and government commit to this. Bravo to Liberia's brave health workers-the foot soldiers on the frontline against the invisible enemy. With God above, our rights to prove, we will overall prevail.