Monday 13 October 2014

Redundancy of Liberia government's 'non-essential staff': Reflections

Civil Service Agency’s proposed redundancy reform process: an initial reaction
Part I:


By Tom Kaydor  /  thkaydor@gmail.com

In some of my posts on the Civil Service Agency’s proposed reform to downsize non-essential staff in ministries and agencies, I did promise to do further analysis on said issue and this is the beginning of the process. It is good to have a well written policy, but it is preferable to have a policy that would be implemented and that will positively impact the governance process. Such reforms must equally tend to reduce poverty and increase equitable distribution of the nation’s resources. That said, besides the seeming lack of an implementation strategy and the proposed reform’s likely inability to affect the legislature and the Judiciary (as others have argued), the timing for such policy reform in Liberia would have disastrous consequences and might increase poverty in the already poor country (4th poorest in the world).

First, poverty in itself reduces people’s consumer surplus and affects aggregate demand. This affects national economy and reduces the country’s international competitiveness and as well retards economic growth, thus further limiting the government’s ability to spare resources for transfers; hence fueling poverty in return. The main asset the poor have is their labor, which in Liberia cannot easily find a market. Private school teachers for example are practically out of job as most of them are not being paid at present. There is no point mentioning the already jobless thousands in the country. The responsibility of the civil servants who are receiving pay has therefore increased given our setting which makes a singular bread winner in a family the sole provider for all. So poverty arguably continues to increase in Liberia, and this will continue to reduce aggregate demand.

Second, in the ebola environment, there are several factors that project an increment in poverty. During the ebola (the greatest global health epidemic posing major national security threat to affected nations), some investments have closed down. Their return and full operation might not be fully realized under this current government. Those who had jobs at those concessions are now temporarily unemployed. Local businesses have been undermined, if some would not or have not already crumbled.  The mainstay of our country’s economy (subsistence agriculture) is grossly affected. Take Lofa for instance where farmers have lost entire season of their production. In fact all farmers in Liberia have been affected. This has far reaching social and economic consequences and might even affect the politics. As families are affected, school would be opening at the end of the virus, these poor families need social protection interventions to not only feed themselves, but to also address children’s school fees, uniforms, tuition and other relate expenditures. This simply shows how poverty would even further increase in Liberia. The Minister of Finance has affirmed the grave economic, social and political challenges that the ebola brings along. He aired this during his interview on the LBS talk show. Presently, some people are unable to pay their rent. Take the case of an ebola survival who on his return from the ETU was put out due to expiration of his rent, and his inability to pay the land lord who singularly survives on the rent friom his humble home in Banjul Community. This story was shared on the Truth FM radio. WFP is presently distributing food and relief items. This should inform that the situation in Liberia is grave and will go a long way. Indeed poverty has increased where majority of the people cannot meet the minimum nutritional suppliments needed on a daily basis. Simply put, the impact of the ebola virus on Liberia would be very significant to the point government now has to begin thinking about increasing transfers to those who are working and those who are jobless. Social protection benefits must be provided to the poor, and social safety nets must be provided to the vulnerable who might fall back into the poverty gap (this includes ‘the non-essential staff’).

Instead of concentrating on such poverty reduction moves, the policy reform to redundant non-essential staff of government aims to remove civil servants from the labor market, and according to the policy (as others have argued) they will be given capacity to lead them to other sectors of employment. Where are the other employment sectors? Where are those sectors when in 2005 campaign it was promised that we would run a small and efficient government, but have only seen the creation of commissions and new government entities with huge salaries and allowances? Where are those other job sectors when we can only witness an increment in the salaries, allowances and other benefits of elected officials and political appointees? Statistically, the salaries of the non-essential staff may not be the significant part of our expenditure. You may need to get the data and run your regressions. Our expenditure is about the huge and discretionary allowances given to some staff in agencies and ministries under the whims and caprices of ministers. Our expenditures are on the luxurious cars and sometimes needless travels of government officials. Our key expenditures are not on those filling clerks or cleaners or secretaries (now considered non-essential). The huge expenditures are paid to some of the very Liberians who are 'consultants' at various ministries and agencies. How much do the non-essential staff earn? Granted that those considered non-essential will be paid for two years and then be transitioned to separation benefits, what is the volume of the pay to non-essential staff compared to political appointees, national consultants and elected officials? Think about it.

Third, on the question of training those to be put down, could the CSA provide an analysis of prospective labor markets/job markets to which they will be shifted. Over 12 years of post-conflict governance, one needs not to lecture about our failure to link the unemployed youths and adults with jobs. We have not created the needed jobs. Is it in an immediate post-ebola environment that such jobs would be generated? Give us the prognosis. Government indicated it would have provided 20 thousand jobs, redeemed 20 million dollars from ghost names, et al. Have those jobs come and gone? Where are the ghosts when there are genuine staff members working in agencies and ministries, but not yet on pay roll for the past five to ten years and even above?

Fourth, Liberia is poised with political tension mainly due to poverty. People are advocating for a change of government amidst an ebola crisis. They argue that the government is corrupt, has failed and needs to giveway. At the same time, some members of the ruling Unity Party are demanding jobs in the very civil service. Health workers are presently agitating for strike actions in demand of their pay and employment. Several teachers are still yet to get on the official pay roll of government. Is it politically feasible to carry out such reform that will affect people who have only relied on government‘s jobs over the years? Are we not venturing with political rivalry and strong opposition from the civil servants? I think the timing for such reform is politically wrong and might lead to demonstrations, strikes, et al. For any policy reform to succeed, it must have the political will, the time must be ripe, and the policy entrepreneurs must find the appropriate venue to introduce same. Introducing such shake up in the civil service during a health epidemic might do more harm than good. This reform does not have the coupling of the problem, politics and policy.

Last, from my experience, and you may share yours, there is no effective and objective criteria and mechanism to measure the efficiency and effectiveness of staff in ministries and agencies. There has also been no objective criteria on which staff are paid. In fact there has been no set and objective criteria for staff recruitment in the civil service over the years. There are instances in which degree holders are office assistants or filing clerks when non degree holders are their supervisors. The first thing to do therefore would be to develop a mechanism through which staff would be placed in positions based on their qualifications and experience. This is called merit system. That is not the focus of this policy. The policy seeks to cleverly fire civil servants. We need to put in place measurable deliverables based on employee’s job description that must conform to contemporary realities. Have you seen the generic CSA TORs? Have you seen the evaluation forms for civil servants? I have seen them, and think better not to have those generic TORs and evaluation forms that currently exist. Is there any empirical study showing information about essential and non-essential staff in terms of the reality on the ground in ministries and agencies? What is that study indicating, if any? From my experience in the government, to the best of my knowledge, such research has not been done yet.


To conclude, as earlier stated, the policy reform looks good on the face, but the timing appears to be wrong. There must be a detailed study on the cost and benefits of this reform especially during the time of ebola crisis. Any hasty implementation of such policy reform might lead to outcomes otherwise intended thereby leading to huge negative unintended consequences. After all, this proposed restructuring of the civil service must also involve the other two branches of government: the Judiciary and the Legislature. And it is only my hope that they would endorse and comply with the terms  of such reform. Remember, poor people are hungry people. Hungry people are angry people. Angry people many times become violent. Too much poverty may therefore create instability in Liberia. 'A hint to a wise is quite sifficient'.

Saturday 20 September 2014

Analysis and policy recommendations on Thailand's binding constraint

Addressing Thailand's middle-income problem

By Tom Kaydor/ thkaydor@gmail.com

I. Introduction to the case

On 1 July 2011, Thailand became a middle-income economy (World Bank 2014).  This economic progress translated into poverty reduction, improved wellbeing, and increased access to public goods and services. For example, ‘over 40 per cent of the Thai population escaped poverty in the past 25 years’ (Jitsuchon 2012, p.13). However, Thailand’s national income statistics (1952-2011) show declining annual growth rates from about ten per cent in early 1990s and afterward due to the Asian and global financial crises, the 2011 floods and political instability (World Bank 2014). Since 1997, Thailand’s growth rate has stagnated around four per cent (Jitsuchon 2012), and its current GDP per capita is US$4420 (UNDP 2014). Due to this stagnant growth, Thailand is said to be caught in a ‘middle income trap’ (Benyaapikul & Phongpaichit 2013, p.1). A middle-income trap results ‘when a country graduates from a low-income economy to a middle-income economy, but stagnates without much prospect of advancing to a developed country status’ (Gill et al. 2007 cited in Jitsuchon 2012, p.15, Kharas and Kholi, p.281). 

Although there are more complex issues to address to promote growth in Thailand, this essay argues that political instability remains the country’s binding constraint. This constraint results from recurrent military interventions in Thai politics, centralized state power, and the failure of key political actors to reach mutually beneficial political compromises (Chambers 2010). The essay therefore proposes that the government of Thailand decentralize power to elected regional governments that will manage local development programmes while the central government concentrates mainly on macro level issues like monetary policy and national security.

II. Key problem or issue in the case

In 1932, Thailand became a constitutional monarchy, replacing the absolute monarchy that was considered a barrier to Thai development (Dixon 1999). Since then, the country adopted 17 different constitutions, and witnessed over 18 actual and attempted military coups (Tweechie 2011). Thailand is politically unstable because of the recurrent meddling of the military into politics (Chambers 2010). As Laothamatas (1988) contends, bureaucrats and military officers centrally manage the affairs of the state. The country, according to Chambers (2010), is a ‘tutelary democracy, ‘a form of defective and unstable democracy under which non-elected elites (the monarch, privy council and military) hold veto powers over elected officials’ (p.837).

In early 2014, failure of the two major rival parties in Thailand to reach political compromise led to another military intervention. Thousands of protesters led by Suthep Thaugsuban, former deputy prime minister and powerbroker in the Democratic Party (‘Yellow Shirts’) mainly Southerners locked down Bangkok, forcing Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra of the Pheu Thai Party (‘Red Shirts’ predominantly from the North and Northeast) to step down, despite a confidence vote from parliament (Nehru 2014). Due to the political stalemate and eventual break down of law and order resulting from the demonstration amongst rival parties, the Thai military declared martial law on 20 May 2014, ordered the cabinet to report to it, and banned gatherings of more than five people (BBC News 22/05/2014). Thailand is presently under a military dictatorship.

III. Theoretically informed discussion of the problem

Political instability is Thailand’s major challenge. First, it undermines economic growth and development, and weakens the share of investment in GDP (Alesina and Perotti 1996). Empirical studies have tested and agreed with said relationship. For example, studies by Barro et al. (1997) and Barro (1996) show a direct negative impact of political instability on economic growth. Also, political instability is a fundamental variable to explain the systematic underperformance of African countries between 1970 and1990 (Guillaumont et al. 1999, Azam et al. 1996 cited in Kefi & Zouhaier 2011, p.798). For their part, De Haan and Siermann (1996) do not contest the effect of instability on growth, but state that instability negatively impacts investment, and low investment slows growth.

Second, instability stalls the building of effective institutions, one of the deep determinants of growth (Rodrik 2003). Institutions are important for sustainable economic growth, but without stability, such growth remains utopian. Peter Hall (1986) defines institutions as ‘the formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and economy’ (p.938). Institutions provide incentives for investment and structure an economy (North 1991). For instance, the Republic of Botswana grew at 7.7 per cent annually from 1965 to 1998 due to the viable political institutions that guaranteed property rights, law and order, prudent resource management, merit based public bureaucracy, and investment in education, health and infrastructure (Acemoglu et al. 2001 cited in Rodrik 2003).

Third, political instability impedes growth, freedom, and prosperity. Thailand is generally violent, socially divided and overwhelmed by populist movements with a large number of actors capable of blocking reforms (Chambers 2010). These divisive factors prevent the building of democratic institutions like those in Botswana, Japan, South Korean, Singapore, et al (Rodrik 2010). The unstable environment undermines economic growth because Thailand operates as a centralized bureaucratic polity mostly ruled by the military class. In addition to this, ‘parties use ministerial positions to enhance factional power in a continuing process of logrolls’ (Pasuk & Baker, 2000, p. 138), and corruption is widespread in the public sector (Pasuk & Baker, 1998, p. 260). Such governance deficiencies are a result of weak institutions nurtured by instability. As Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) argue, authoritarian, centralized and exclusive institutions, like those in Thailand, have disastrous consequences on growth as they avail no incentives for investment and innovation. Accordingly ‘it is politics, not geography, culture, et al., that determines the economy’ (p. 544). Effective institutions create a level playing field whereby most citizens can enjoy secure property rights, gain access to an independent judicial system, develop their personal capabilities (North 1991), and invest in technology and innovation for steady economic progress (Jones & Romer 2010). Institutions become even more effective when they are inclusive and decentralized.

Last, instability is further compounded by constitutional biases against elected officials. This increases political volatility. For instance, the constitution allows the military and judiciary to appoint and approve independent bodies, such as the National Counter Corruption Commission, the Election Commission, and the Constitutional Court Judges (Thai Constitution 2007). The military can institute marshal law, and effect promotions in its ranks and file (Chambers 2010). The constitution also forbids the Parliament from approving Thai military budget, which sharply rose from ‘US$2b in 2006 to about US$6b in 2011’ (Chambers 2010, p.850). It grants ‘vetos to the non-elected monarch, privy council and the military’ over elected parliamentarians (Chambers 2010, p. 827). Finally, the Thai judiciary sometimes interferes with the parliament by removing prime ministers as was done in 2007, 2008 (Howes & Lopez, 2013, p.8), and 2014 (BBC News 22/05/2014). Such practices increase political instability and slow economic growth in Thailand (Kuhonta 2011).

IV. Decentralisation as a pathway to stability and economic growth

Economic reforms are one of the options for growth in Thailand. According to Jitsuchon (2012), Thailand’s growth relied on ‘cheap labour, and low innovation, with technological acquired mainly through technology importation’ (p.15). As one of the stylized facts of growth predicts, once a state grows towards the technology frontier, its growth slows (Jones & Romer 2010). Thus, Thailand’s old growth model can no longer expand growth. However, if one should rely on economic growth theory, then the country must readjust its economic model. It must diversify production networks (Kharas & Kholi 2011), break monopolistic powers, decentralize governance, and invest in education, research and development to trigger innovations (Jimanez et al. 2012, Acemoglu & Zillibotti 1999). However, all these growth corridors cannot survive amidst political instability in Thailand (Alesina & Perotti 1996).

Consequently, Thai reform agenda must focus on decentralization to create political stability as a precursor to all other reforms. Decentralisation is the transfer of powers from central government to lower levels in an administrative hierarchy (Crook & Manor 1998). It locally provides efficient public goods compared to central government (Oates 1972). Decentralization creates an enabling environment for inclusive political, economic and social reforms because the locals directly lead decision making; it therefore usually promotes political stability. Decentralization gives local authorities the freedom to compete, innovate, and attract investment and technology, which generate local employment, productivity and growth. Employment opportunities drive skills development through education to enhance human capital (TDRI 2012). Enhanced human capital increases productivity and promotes innovation; and all of these factors combined increase growth (Jones & Romer 2010).

To begin the process of decentralization, the current Thai government should constitutionally set up regional governments. The regional governments will comprise locally elected parliaments, premiers and appointed judiciaries. They will manage and support regional and local development programmes, and invest in economic activities like agriculture and industry. The central government would focus on macro level issues like monetary policy and national security. Decentralization might shift attention from Bangkok to regional governments, promote equitable distribution of economic opportunities, increase competition and accountability, enhance trade and investment, and spur innovation. It will stabilize Thailand because the ‘Yellow Shirts’, mainly Southerners, would focus on their regional government, while the ‘Red Shirts’ would concentrate on theirs in the North. The military and political elites in Bangkok would be compelled to address regional demands to gain regional authorities’ support.

While decentralization might increase political stability, increase access to basic services, promote regional competition, and spur growth, it might cause new problems such as a clash in resource allocation between the central and local authorities, and the decline of state macroeconomic management. According to Zhong Zhu Ding (1998), decentralization complicates and disturbs China's growth and development. In September 1995, Chinese President Jiang Zemin said ‘in the process of structural reform, some provinces favoured their local interests and therefore resisted the central government's policies’ (Zhong p.63).  Decentralization in Thailand might therefore weaken central macroeconomic management, and undermine national unity. However, Thailand needs to constitutionally spell out the powers of central and provincial governments to mitigate against the possible drawbacks of devolution.


 References
Alesina, A, Perotti, R 1994, ‘The political economy of growth: a critical survey of the literature’, The World Bank Economic Review, no. 8, pp. 351–71.

Acemoglu, D, Robinson, J 2012, Why nations fail: the origins of power, prosperity and poverty, New York, USA.

Acemoglu, D, Zillibotti, F 1999, ‘Productivity differences’, NBER Working Papers No. 6879, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.

Baker, C, Pasuk, P 1998, Thailand’s boom and bust, Silkworm Books, Chiang Mai, Thailand.

Barro, J 1996, ‘Democracy and growth’, Journal of Economic Growth, no.1, pp.1-27.

Barro, RJ, 1997, Determinants of economic growth: A cross–country empirical study, MIT Press, Cambridge, USA.

BBC World News 2014, viewed 9 August 2014,

BBC World News 2014, viewed 15 August 2014,
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-27297478>.

Benyaapikul, P, Phongpaichit, P 2013, Political economic dimension of a middle income trap: challenges and opportunities for policy reform in Thailand, Bangkok, Thailand.

Chambers, P 2010, ‘Thailand on the brink: resurgent military, eroded democracy’, Asian Survey, vol. 50, no. 5, pp. 835-858.

Crook, R, Manor, J 1998, Democracy and decentralization in South Asia and West Africa, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

De Haan, J, Siermann, J 1998, ‘Further evidence on the relationship between economic freedom and economic growth’, Public Choice, no. 95, pp.363-380, MIT Press, Cambridge.

Dixon, J, Heffernan, M 1991, Colonialism and development in the contemporary world, London, England, New York,: Mansell Pub.

Dixon, J 1999, The Thai economy: uneven development internationalization, New York, Routledge.

Hall, P, Taylor, R 1992, ‘Political Science and the three new institutionalisms’, Political Studies, vol. 44, no.5, pp. 936-957.

Howes, S, Lopez, G 2013, ‘Thailand: economic growth achievements and challenges’, Crawford 8000 case study, Crawford School of Public Policy, ANU, Canberra, ACT.

Jimenez, E, Nguyen, V & Patrinos, H 2012, Human Development Network Education Unit Policy Research Working Paper 6283, The World Bank, Washington DC, USA.

Jitsuchon, S 2012, Thailand in a middle-income trap, Thailand Development Research Institute, Bangkok, viewed 8 August 2014,

Jones, I, Romer, M 2010, ‘The new Kaldor facts: ideas, institutions, population and human capital’, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 224-245.

Kefi, M, Zouhaier, H 2011, ‘Institutions and economic growth’, Asian Economic and Financial Review, vol. 2, no.7, pp.795-812.

Kharas, H, Kohli, H 2011, ‘What is the middle income trap, why do countries fall into it, and how can it be avoided?’ Global Journal of Emerging Market Economies, vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 281-9.

Kuhonta, E 2011, The institutional imperative: the politics of equitable development in Southeast Asia, Stanford University Press.

Laothamatas, A 1988, ‘Business and politics in Thailand: new patterns of influence’, Asian Survey, vol. 28, no. 4, pp.451-470.

Nehru, V 2014, ‘There is still a way out in Thailand’s crises, The Jakarta Globe (online), 17 January, viewed 13 August 2014
<http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/01/17/there-still-is-way-out-of-thailand-s-crisis>.

North, D 1991, ‘Institutions’, American Economic Association Stable, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 97-112. 

Oates, E, 1972, Fiscal federalism, New York, USA.

Rodrik, D 2003, ‘What do we learn from country narratives?’ in Robrik, D (ed), In Search of prosperity, Princeton University Press.

Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI) 2012, Revamping the Thai Education System: Quality for all, a collection of research papers for TDRI 2011 year-end conference, Bangkok, Thailand.

Thailand Constitution 2007, viewed 10 August 2014,
<https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Thailand_2007.pdf>.

The World Bank 2014, viewed 15 August 2014,
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/thailand/overview>.

Tweedie, P 2011, ‘Thailand election primer’, The Asia Foundation, 29 June, viewed 9 August 2014,
<http://asiafoundation.org/in-asia/2011/06/29/thailand-election-primer/>.

UNDP Thailand 2014, viewed 10 August 2014,
<http://www.th.undp.org/content/thailand/en/home/ourwork/democraticgovernance/overview.html>.

Zhong, D 1998, Decentralization and new central-local conflicts in China, American Asian Reviewhttp://search.proquest.com.virtual.anu.edu.au/assets/r20141.2.2-2/core/spacer.gif, vol. 16 no. 4http://search.proquest.com.virtual.anu.edu.au/assets/r20141.2.2-2/core/spacer.gif, pp.63-94.


Friday 12 September 2014

All Hail to Liberian Health Workers


Thankink the Health Workers in Liberia for fighting ebola:
By Tom Kaydor/thkaydor@gmail.com

Dr. Brown and all those health workers who have paid the ultimate price with their lives as well as those who remain on the frontline must be commended. There are lessons to learn. Most of the health students in Liberia support their personal education. Now they are putting their lives on the line for our country like the military and police would do in time of national security crisis. Just as we pay from national budget to train the army and police, it is about time we consider free education for all health workers in Liberia after the ebola crisis. This will not only help health students whose academic sojourn is constrained by financial problems, it will also encourage more Liberian high school graduates to enter the health sector. From the ebola crisis, we must now know that health and education are very much important for nation building. If a population is sick, it cannot make progress. Imagine businesses and investments are closed, etc. People are stopping flights while others are abandoning their positions in government due to ebola. This should remind us that health is very much important. But how do we get professional health workers? We must provide for their education. This brings education as the most important priority for any given country. Henceforth, Liberian must take education and health as the two major obstacles to overcome if we must prosper, grow our economy and develop. This is the time to provide the millions of US Dollars to train Liberians in health and education. Free education for all from KG to 12 grade, free education for all health and natural science students. These are the programmes the government must focus on and lobby the international community to support after the ebola crisis, and I am quite certain that we now have more justifications to make such claims. These are programmes donors would like to support after the ebola, only and only if the people and government commit to this. Bravo to Liberia's brave health workers-the foot soldiers on the frontline against the invisible enemy. With God above, our rights to prove, we will overall prevail.

Sunday 24 August 2014

Thinking Liberia on Flag Day, 24 August 2014

My thoughts for Liberia:

The lesson to learn from the ebola outpbreak is that government and partners in Liberia must take human security as the frame for national development whereby Liberians will live in freedom from fear, freedom from environmental degradation, freedom from infectious disease like ebola, freedom from poverty, freedom from lack of basic services (such as water, healthcare, and education), freedom from lack of adequate infrastructure like electricity and roads, and freedom from the more conventional threats of violence. Building the human capital of the people would make them more productive and allow them to enjoy these freedoms because they will have jobs and earn a living. Innovation will spring up and boom, and peace and security will thrive in the Free Land of Liberty. The recent violent situation in West Point speaks volumes about how young people become violent when majority of them lack skills and the means to earn a just living. Wake up! Policy makers, a food for thought on this Flag Day.

Tom Kaydor

Sunday 20 July 2014

Talking Corruption in Africa

Talking Corruption in Africa

By Thomas Kaydor/ 20 July 2014
According to Transparency International (2013) @ www.transparency.org,  the perceived levels of public sector corruption in 177 countries and territories around the world ( http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results) Liberia ranks 83 globally, and 15th place amongst all African states. This is good news for Liberians to celebrate, though so much is still required to reach the best mark so that Liberia can become the most corruption free State in Africa.
In order of ranking for African states:

State
Rank
Botswana
30
Cape Verde
41
Seychelles
47
Rwanda
49
Mauritius
52
Lesotho
55
Namibia
57
Ghana
63
Sao Tome and Principe
72
South Africa
72
Senegal
77
Tunisia
77
Swaziland
82
Burkina Faso
83
Liberia
83


According to Transparency International (2013) ‘every effort has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in this report. All information was believed to be correct as of November 2013. Nevertheless, Transparency International cannot accept responsibility for the consequences of its use for other purposes or in other contexts’.

Friday 4 July 2014

Development, Governance and Public Policy: Reflecting on Anti-Corruption Efforts in Liberia

Development, Governance and Public Policy: Reflecting on Anti-Corruption Efforts in Liberia: Reflecting on anti-corruption efforts in Liberia, West Africa: By Thomas Kaydor/ 29 June 2014 (thkaydor@gmail.com) Corruption is one...

Development, Governance and Public Policy: Need for equal access to quality tertiary educatio...

Development, Governance and Public Policy: Need for equal access to quality tertiary educatio...: Report on blog post by John Quiggin Thomas Kaydor/5 July 2-14 < http://johnquiggin.com/2014/04/28/stratification-in-tertiary-educat...

Need for equal access to quality tertiary education

Report on blog post by John Quiggin

Thomas Kaydor/5 July 2-14

This essay reports on John Quiggin’s blog (http://johnquiggin.com/) where, on 28 April 2014, he posted ‘stratification in tertiary education’. In this post, Quiggin (2014) argues that those calling for Australia’s adoption of the US’ highly stratified tertiary educational system are advocating for increased stratification in Australia’s tertiary educational system. He notes that the Ivy League universities (like Harvard and Princeton) in the US provide undergraduate education to only a tiny proportion of young Americans (about one per cent). Hence, should Australia adopt similar system, each ‘Australian Ivy League’ would only absorb about a thousand students annually, and this could deny thousands of students the opportunity to obtain university education from institutions of their choice. Quiggin points out that tertiary education systems reflect and reconstruct the society to which they belong; as a result, the highly stratified systems in the US and UK, signify and strengthen ‘a class-bound society in which the best thing one can do is to choose the right parents’.  Although Quiggin acknowledges Australia’s less stratified education system, he opposes increased stratification, which could widen the gap between the group of eight and the rest of the universities in the country. He therefore recommends that the country should reduce stratification in the education system, and calls on policymakers to consider tertiary education like other public services provided to all.

Indeed, university education should be treated like other social services that a state must provide to its citizens without discrimination.  According to Jeffrey Haynes (2008), ‘the people are the real wealth of a nation’, hence the achievement of the basic objective of their development requires the creation of an enabling environment for them to live longer, healthier and creative lives (p. 12). Equal access to quality education creates that enabling environment and breeds a more productive society. Support for quality education like other social services is therefore an investment in the human capital of a country (Gans et al. 2013). This increases productivity of the labour force and its income, thereby leading to economic growth and prosperity. Consequently, countries should not stratify educational systems, because this hinders citizens’ access to equitable education. The ability of a citizen to get quality university education should depend on his or her ability to enrol and complete a university.

Stratified tertiary education is not unique to the US, UK and other developed countries. It also exists in developing countries.  In Liberia, for example, the free American slaves who founded the nation set up the then singular state owned Liberia College in 1862, which later became University of Liberia (UL) in 1951, to train state elites and their children.  Indigenous Liberians (95 percent of the population) were not allowed to enrol at the University of Liberia up to the 1960s, unless they were servants of the elites, and changed their indigenous names to western ones (Wreh 1976). Graduates from the UL were given preferential employment in the public and private sectors. This stratified educational system perpetuated illiteracy amongst the majority indigenous tribes. Lack of tertiary education meant lack of employment opportunities for the majority. This also meant that 95 per cent of the country’s population remained illiterate and could only engage in subsistence farming to feed themselves, but could not promote economically beneficial ventures.  This system entrenched a minority elitist aristocracy in Liberia for 133 unbroken years, undermined productivity and stalled economic growth amidst enormous natural resources, thereby increasing poverty (Sawyer 1991). Suppression of the indigenous majority led to the over throw of the Liberian oligarchy on 12 April 1980 by 17 illiterate non-commissioned army officers from the indigenous tribes; thus the beginning of the two decades civil unrest in Liberia (Youboty 2004).

Tertiary education is linked with one of the ten lessons from economics, ‘a country’s standard of living depends on its ability to produce goods and services’ (Gans et al. 2013, p. 13).  The variation in the standard of living across countries is a function of divergent levels of productivity. Educational standards and productivity are fundamentally linked. The better educated a country’s population, the more productive its citizens, and the better living standard they enjoy. Therefore, making tertiary education equitable means affording all citizens equal access and opportunity to quality education. Quality education will improve living standard, hence policymakers need to raise productivity by ensuring that workers are well educated and equipped with the requisite tools and technology required to produce goods and services.



References

Gans, J, King, S, Stonecash, R & Mankiw, G 2013, Principles of Economics, China Translation and Printing Services, Beijing, China.

Haynes, J 2008, Development studies: short introductions, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK.

Sawyer, A 1992, The emergence of autocracy in Liberia: tragedy and challenge, ICS, San Francisco, California. 

Wreh, T 1976, The love of liberty … the rule of President William V.S. Tubman in Liberia 1944-1971, C Hurst and Company, London, UK.

Youboty, J 2004, A nation in terror: the true story of the Liberian Civil War, USA.

<http://johnquiggin.com/2014/04/28/stratification-in-tertiary-education/>.


Sunday 29 June 2014

Reflecting on Anti-Corruption Efforts in Liberia

Reflecting on anti-corruption efforts in Liberia, West Africa:
By Thomas Kaydor/ 29 June 2014 (thkaydor@gmail.com)

Corruption is one of the biggest themes on the lips of Liberians today. This issue has become prominent in the national debate because President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, during her inaugural address on 16 January 2006, said ‘corruption will be public enemy number one’. Today, the President’s critics are judging her by this statement claiming that ‘not much is being done to prosecute corrupt government officials’. Besides newspapers’ reports and talk show callers, one of the groups of Liberians holding the President accountable to this promise is the Liberia Institute for Public Integrity (LIPI), which alleges that President Sirleaf spent over two million US Dollars without accountability. While advocacy against corruption is laudable and that the people must hold the President accountable, it seems that some critics tend to ignore or forget the enormous efforts put in the fight against corruption in Liberia, efforts for which perhaps corruption has become topical today compared to the days of previous autocratic regimes that endorsed corruption as a modus operandi. For instance, Former President Taylor once asserted that ‘the civil servants are not being paid, yet they are not complaining because they go to work every day, pay themselves, and remain shinning’. Yet under Taylor’s regime, and the ones prior to, corruption in the public sector did not become a ubiquitous thematic debate as is today in the post-conflict country.

Why corruption remains intrinsic in Liberia, there are currently more avenues through which this societal vice can be brutally dealt with in the interest of the people of Liberia and the state at large. Most of these integrity institutional frameworks can be credited to the Sirleaf lead government, and for this, she needs to be commended. First, Liberia has an independent General Auditing Commission (GAC) that reports to the National Legislature. Though the GAC was founded during the leadership of Chairman Charles G. Bryant, Madam Sirleaf was its key proponent when she headed the Good Governance Commission as Chair. The commissioners and staff members of the GAC are being paid handsome salaries from the resources of Liberia. The GAC has submitted several reports to the National Legislature. The World Bank is funding the Legislature’s Public Accounts Committee (PAC) Secretariat, which supports the legislative Public Accounts Committee in scrutinizing audit reports sent to the Legislature to allow the first branch of government recommend remedial actions to the Executive for prosecution of those who may be implicated for misuse, abuse and plunder of public resources.

To what extent has the Legislature done its part of the job in fighting corruption by speedily passing on these audit recommendations to the Executive for prosecution? Can the media, civil society and the people begin to pressure the National Legislature (the direct representatives of the people) to do its part of the job as opposed to solely blaming the Executive for not clamping down on corruption? In the same vein, can the National Legislature allow its financial system and processes to be audited by the GAC? How can the Legislature come with clean hands to recommend prosecution against would be corrupt officials when the entity itself does not want to be audited? The failure of the Legislature to allow audit in its backyard for the past nine years brings the so called first branch of government’s integrity under dark cloud. Can the Legislature allow an audit of its records?

Second, there exists the Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission which should serve as a watch dog and hold corrupt officials accountable. The LACC was ‘was established in August 2008 to directly investigate, recommend for prosecution all acts of corruption in all sectors of government including the private sector and to institute measures aimed at eradicating the practice and its impact’. This body, according to some critics, is yet to show its actual powers. The commissioners and staff members are also being paid handsome salaries from the resources of Liberia. Can the LACC therefore become a robust entity rather than sitting in offices waiting for corrupt cases? What mechanisms are there at the LACC to aggressively pursue corrupt officials and corrupt public servants? Can this Commission become an efficient and effective integrity institution? Some critics are not convinced that the LACC stands out in using the powers given it under its statutory mandate. In public policy, statutory entities are to enhance national agenda setting and implementation. In this case, the LACC has to play a lead and robust role in setting and implementing the agenda for curbing, if not eliminating, corruption in Liberia. Arguably, the LACC is yet to step up to its mandate. Can the public, media and civil society begin to push the LACC to do its work rather than solely blame the President for corruption in Liberia?

Third, there is the Freedom of Information Act under which the public, civil society and interested parties can demand information and documentations from any government entity in the event such information is needed. The commissioner and staff members are equally being paid handsome salaries from the resources of Liberia. Under this law, all Liberians have the right to demand documents and reports from their public institutions if they feel there is an abuse and misuse of government resources. Can the media, the civil society and ordinary citizens take advantage of this law to bring corrupt practices to the public glare for possible prosecution such that this menace is curbed or eliminated?

Last, there is the Public Procurement and Concession Commission (PPCC). This Commission was set up to amongst other things streamline public procurement process. An ACT ‘establishes the Public Procurement and Concessions Commission (PPCC) with oversight responsibility to regulate and monitor all forms of public procurement and concessions practices in Liberia. The PPCC has the elaborate mandate of monitoring procurement entities to comply with the Act of 2005 for all public procurement and awarding concessions, in order to ensure economy, efficiency, transparency and to promote competition so that Government gets “value for money”  in using public funds’. The commissioners and staff of this commission are, like other commissions, receiving handsome salaries from the taxes of Liberia. This Commission was instituted to serve as a hedge against corrupt practices in the procurement sector of our public sector. Can the public therefore focus on ensuring that the PPCC processes are religiously followed rather than solely blaming the President for failure to fight corruption?

Arguably, all these institutions serve as a quantum and laudable public policy hedge against corruption. They could take Liberia forward in winning the battle against corruption, but this can only happen if the people (public) hold them accountable to their mandates. The fight against a century old systemic corruption in Africa’s first Republic would not end within a decade. It requires concerted efforts by the people of Liberia, the government and civil society to ensure that this fight is advanced in the best interest of the state now and in the future. Blaming the President alone does not solve the deep seated problem of corruption. The public, Legislature, Executive and Judiciary must each do their part, and collaborate, to ensure that the fight against corruption is taken to a logical conclusion.

Corruption is not unique to Liberia, but this does not mean that Liberia should remain one of the countries rated with high corruption levels. Corruption is widespread in western and developed countries. For example, reporting on a corrupt syndicate at the Sydney Airport, the Australia’s Integrity Commissioner, Philip Moss (2003) concluded that ‘an enduring lesson is that corruption risk will follow opportunity for illicit profit. Policy designers, and those responsible for governance of high-risk operating environments, must expect this situation to be the case, and plan accordingly’. Can Liberians use the existing integrity institutions to push policy designers and those working in high-risk operating environments to become accountable and transparent?

Least you get me wrong, the President, as Head of State, is under obligation to fight corruption under her regime, but without the support of the existing integrity institutional frameworks (GAC, LACC, PPCC, FOIA, et al.), Liberia may linger in corruption at the hands of public servants, and the country may remain underdeveloped due to the lack of accountability and transparency, and abuse and misuse of public resources. The time is now for all to unite against corruption rather than blame a single individual (the President) who alone cannot address systemic corruption in the Republic of Liberia. The debate about corruption has become prominent today because the democratic space exists now than before. Let Liberians therefore take advantage of such space and the integrity institutional frameworks to fight corruption in all its forms and manners, no matter who is involved in Liberia, a fragile state still recovering from 14 years fratricidal civil conflict. This is the challenge.

Liberia First!

Profile: Thomas Kaydor
Thomas Kaydor is Representative of the College of Asia and the Pacific (CAP), Member of the CAP Board, and Member of the Permanent Representative Council (PRC) of PARSA. Mr Kaydor, a Liberian, is a postgraduate student at the Crawford School of Economics and Government, ANU, reading Master of Public Policy, and Master of Diplomacy. He holds M.A (High Distinction) in International Relations, University of Liberia, where he served as President of the Postgraduate Students Association; and B.A (Magna Cum Laude) in Political Science, the University of Liberia. He also holds a Diploma in Management and Development of NGOs, Galilee College,    Israel;    Certificate in Human Rights & Results Based Management, UN System Staff College, Turin, Italy, and Postgraduate Diploma in Diplomacy and Negotiation, Islamabad Foreign Service Academy, Pakistan.

He served as Assistant Minister for Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Liberia, and coordinated Liberia’s diplomatic relations with all Afro Asian and the Pacific states. He was also UN Coordination Services Adviser, UNDP Ethiopia; and UN Coordination Analyst, UNDP Liberia. He provided effective coordination support to the UN Country Teams, promoting UN reform, Joint Programming, Delivering as One, et al. He was Chief of Office Staff, Liberian National Legislature; Field Supervisor, USAID Social-Reintegration Programme; Psychosocial Officer, World Vision International; and Part-Time Instructor, University of Liberia,  and the AME University, Liberia.

He has published several articles including, but not limited to the following:
“The obstacles to achieving MDG2 in post-conflict Liberia”.
“The impact of poor infrastructure on poverty reduction in post-conflict countries: the case of Liberia”.
“Cash transfers are not sufficient for poverty reduction: this must be complemented by other basic social services to lift the poor out of poverty”.

He is also publishing a book at the Authorhouse: “Liberian Democracy: a Critique of Checks and Balances”.