Critiquing John Ravenhill on Ease Asain Regionalism...

Critiquing John Ravenhill’s Article:

“East Asian Regionalism: Much Ado About Nothing?

22 March 2014

By: Thomas Kaydor       

In his article, “East Asian Regionalism: Much Ado About Nothing?”, Ravenhill (2009) argues that, in East Asia, negotiation and inter-governmental collaboration have increased primarily in trade and financial cooperation.  He asserts that the region’s economic agreements are largely motivated by diplomatic and strategic interests; hence ‘aggregate benefits from them are likely to be limited given the low levels of tariffs, et al.’ (Ravenhill 2009). I think the article is good because of Ravenhill’s clarity and logic, the merits and criticisms of regionalism discussed in the article, and factors militating against East Asian viable regionalism. Despite these positive elements, Ravenhill failed to provide concrete recommendations for building effective East Asian regional institutions. He also failed to appraise the impact of the US involvement in East Asia regionalism especially in the security sector.

East Asian regionalism is traceable to the 1967 formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Ravenhill 2009). ASEAN became a genuine region-wide inter-governmental institution in 1999 when China, Japan and Korea where coopted, thus transforming it into the ASAEN Plus Three grouping. This transformation transcended handling of the aftermath of 1997-98 financial crisis to increasing intra-regional cooperation on trade, finance, disaster management, tourism, and energy. ASEAN has attracted admirers and critics. Admirers believe that East Asian regionalism thrives on respect for sovereignty and commitment to peacefully resolving disputes. They argue that ‘East Asia has created a diplomatic community, and laid the foundation for regional security architecture’ (Ravenhill 2009), although there is no substantive regional security institution, as the region is driven by individualistic interests of member states-some maintaining security cooperation with the US (Park 2001). I think the region needs a viable security cooperation. Contrarily, ASEAN’s critics believe that some gains ascribed to the institution are overstated. For instance, they contend that the late 1980s peaceful resolution of the Cambodia-Vietnam conflict was not an achievement of ASEAN, but rather an outcome of international negotiation. I disagree here because an international intervention without regional support would not have brought lasting peace between the two countries. 

On challenges confronting East Asian regionalism, regional governments fail to comply with commitments in economic agreements. They practice protectionism, and lack effective dispute settlement mechanisms. For example, East Asian states signed agreements with non-Asian WTO members and uphold those agreements, but fail to uphold agreements amongst ASEAN members (Ravenhill 2009). As a booming global economic region, I think the governments need to overcome mistrust, eschew protectionism and fulfill their obligations under regional cooperation agreements. ASEAN member states should price effective regional cooperation over national self-interests. This will allow them benefit more from regional and international trade especially when the region is strongly bonded under an effective regional institution.

To conclude, John Ravenhill’s article provides a comprehensive account of the status of East Asian regionalism, which is viewed as a shallow consultative cooperation fora where governments conduct public diplomacy while protecting their autonomy against effective regional integration (Ravenhill 2009). Despite the article’s good attributes, Ravenhill failed to proffer concrete recommendations to mitigate the challenges militating against effective East Asian regionalism. He also failed to comment on the impact of the US’ cooperation with Japan, Korea, Australia, Indonesia, etc. I think these cooperations undermine building of effective regional institutions because the US alliances provide less incentives for East Asian regionalism.

References

Park, J 2001, ‘The US-led Alliances in the Asia-Pacific: hedge against potential threats or an undesirable multilateral security order?’, The Pacific Review, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 137-158.

Ravenhill J 2009, ‘East Asian Regionalism: Much Ado About Nothing?’, Review of International Studies, vol. 35, pp. 215-235.

Critiquing Prof Joseph Nye on the furute of American Power

CRITIQUING THE ARTICLE:  “THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POWER: DOMINANCE AND DECLINE IN PERSPECTIVE”, BY PROFESSOR JOSEPH NYE (2010)

Tom Kaydor

9 March 2014

In his article “The Future of American Power: Dominance and Decline in Perspective”, Professor Joseph Nye (2010) argues that the United States (US) will not experience ‘absolute decline’ because its power is based on alliances and ‘ideological flexibility’. He further argues that ‘non-state actors’ will dominate the global stage and diffuse power as opposed to the perceived pre-eminence of China. Nye logically argues with clarity and coherence, but he is a bit dismissive of some key factors that pose plausible threat to America’s global dominance.

Regarding the merits of Nye’s argument, he admits the diminishing predominant share of US power resources, but argues that the rise of China or other powers over the US is unattainable. Additionally, he maintains that the US enjoys hard power dominance unlike economic power which is dispersed such that the role of non-state actors is increasingly taking center stage, hence the need for the US ‘to adopt a smart strategy that combines hard and soft power resources, and builds alliances to respond to the new realities’. Furthermore, Nye recounts advantages that immune the US from an ‘absolute decline’. For example, he cites the geographic position which forestalls easy invasion of US, and the country’s East Asia partnership, mainly with Japan and India, which counterbalances China’s dominance in the region. He also argues that the US sustains a high per capital income such that ‘China’s per capital, tripling that of the US, will not surpass the US’ by 2030’. Nye views America’s high technological advancement, the country’s unmatched spending on research and development, and higher education as drivers of US soft power. 

Despite the cogent analysis made by Nye, he is dismissive of some plausible factors posing serious challenge to US current global dominance. First, he acknowledges that US debt burden is ‘a long term risk that could be mitigated by good policies’, yet, he did not suggest any policy options. He ignores the implications of this risk on US hard power which should be sustained by economic growth. If the US debt burden continues to grow, military power could be constrained as the state may shift focus on economic growth thus undermining defense spending amongst others. Second, Nye acknowledges the impressive economic growth of China, but dismisses the eventual rise of that country over the US indicating that ‘the Chinese economy may exceed the size of that of the US in a few decades, but that is not the same as equality’. This assertion requires stronger justification compared to the reasons he provides. 

To improve the article, Nye could have considered US economic downturn and debt burden as one of the greatest threats to America’s hegemony.  He should have also suggested solutions to reverse the economic slowdown in the US.  Additionally, he could have provided empirical arguments against China’s rise rather than the issues of ‘governance, regional inequality and rural poverty’ that he cites as obstacles to China’s rise over the US.

To conclude, this reading is generally good for its logical argument, clarity and coherence. Despite Nye’s well-structured and logical argument, his dismissive attitude towards US economic meltdown and the probable rise of China over the US leave much to desire in a dynamic global environment of power contest.   History will show whether the United States will retain global dominance or China and or any other power will supplant the US.

Reference:

Nye, J 2010, “The Future of American Power: Dominance and Decline in Perspective”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, no. 6, pp. 2-12.

Reflectiing on Ukraine: The Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

Reflecting on the Developments in Ukraine

Tom Kaydor

9 March 14

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P or RtoP) is an emerging norm that sovereignty is not a right, but that states must protect their populations from mass atrocity crimes—namely genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing. The R2P has three foundation "pillars":

1.        A state has a responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing.

2.       The international community has a responsibility to assist the state to fulfill its primary responsibility.

3.        If the state manifestly fails to protect its citizens from the four above mass atrocities and peaceful measures have failed, the international community has the responsibility to intervene through coercive measures such as economic sanctions. Military intervention is considered the last resort.

While R2P is a norm and not a law, it is firmly grounded in international law, especially the laws relating to sovereignty, peace and security, human rights and armed conflict. R2P provides a framework for using tools that already exist, i.e. mediation, early warning mechanisms, economic sanctioning, and chapter VII powers, to prevent mass atrocities. Civil society organizations, states, regional organizations, and international institutions all have a role to play in the R2P process. The authority to employ the last resort and intervene militarily rests solely with United Nations Security Council.

Criticisms of the R2P include a "moral outrage and hysteria [that] often serve as a pretext for ‘interventions of the civilized world’ and ‘humanitarian interventions’, which often conceal the true strategic motives, and it thus becomes another name for proxy wars.

With the above background, I think Russia’s move is to prevent further deterioration of the situation in Ukraine especially where some of the Russian speaking peoples are targets of a systematic plan for possible elimination. Now that these Russian speaking people are beginning to express reunion with Russia, it is important for the international community to respect their rights to self-determination, freedom, et al. as have been done in the cases of South Sudan, and other regions where plebiscites have been conduct to give the people the voice to determine their own destinies. 

 

The R2P philosophy has driven big powers like the US, Britain, France, etc. to intervene in conflicts unilaterally (not waiting for approval from the UNSC).  We saw that in Kuwait, Iraq,  et al.